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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge: 
 
This appeal presents the question whether a suit in the 
District Court for the District of Delaware brought by 
certain Delaware property owners challenging assessments 
charged to them to provide for an expanded sewer system 
is barred either by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1341 
-- which provides that "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, 
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of 
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy may be had in the courts of such State"-- or by 
principles of comity. Because we find that the district court 





This civil action challenges decisions taken by the 
defendants -- members and officials of the Sussex County 
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Council ("the County defendants"), and officials of the 
Delaware Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control ("the DNREC defendants")-- to (1) 
authorize the establishment of the "West Rehoboth 
Expansion of the Dewey Beach Sanitary Sewer District" and 
(2) take subsequent steps to implement such authorization. 
The plaintiffs -- appellants in this court -- are several 
persons owning real property in the expanded sewer district 
("the Property Owners"). The Property Owners allege that, 
by virtue of the establishment of the expanded sewer 
district, they are being compelled to discontinue reliance on 
their own septic systems and, in lieu thereof, to join the 
expanded sewer system and to pay an array of service 
charges and fees for the privilege of obligatory participation 
in the expanded sewer system. 
 
The complaint sets forth three counts arising under 
federal law. The first count, based upon 42 U.S.C. S 1983, 
alleges deprivations by the County defendants of the 
Property Owners' Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
procedural due process; this count undergirds the Property 
Owners' most strongly argued claim -- namely, that under 
Delaware law the establishment of the expanded sewer 
district could be legally accomplished only pursuant to a 
vote (an "election") of the affected Property Owners, a 
procedural step not taken in this instance. The second 
count, also based upon 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleges that the 
actions of the County defendants and the DNREC 
defendants have infringed upon the Property Owners' 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process: 
the Property Owners contend that the defendants' actions 
were not based on any rationally supportable public health 
concerns and that they "have impinged upon the [Property 
Owners'] use and enjoyment of their real property by 
mandating a financial charge and legal encumbrance 
thereon, as well as limiting, controlling, and charging for 
the use of said property." Complaint at p. 15. The third 
count, undertaking to set forth a claim pursuant to 33 
U.S.C. S 1365(a)(2), the civil enforcement provision of the 
Clean Water Act,1 alleges that the DNREC defendants failed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 33 U.S.C. S 1365(a)(2) provides: "[A]ny citizen may commence a civil 
action on his own behalf . . . against the [EPA] Administrator where 
there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty 
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator." 
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to perform certain federally mandated environmental and 
cost reviews.2 
 
The Property Owners brought this suit as a proposed 
class action, alleging their readiness to represent an 
estimated 7000 persons said to be similarly situated. The 
complaint recites that, by way of relief: 
 
        Plaintiffs request, for themselves and all other 
       members of the class, that: 
 
        A. The rights of the class members to have an 
       election on the establishment of the "West Rehoboth 
       Expansion of the Dewey Beach Sanitary Sewer 
       District" be adjudicated and declared, and that the 
       prior unlawfully decreed Sewer District be declared 
       void ab initio; 
 
        B. The defendants and each of them be 
       temporarily and permanently restrained and enjoined 
       from requiring members of the class to connect to the 
       unlawfully created sewer district and from charging 
       or assessing said members of the class for the costs 
       of creating, constructing, maintaining and operating 
       said sewer district (and any debt thereon), unless 
       and until such time as the sewer district is lawfully 
       created by election and compliance with 9 Del.C. Ch. 
       65, after proper environmental and cost review, and 
       from any further construction of said sewer district, or 
       creation of new debt thereon, without further order 
       of the Court; 
 
        C. The defendants be Ordered to notify all 
       persons, within the said sewer district, of their right 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The complaint also contains a fourth count charging both sets of 
defendants with a variety of derelictions of state law. However, there is 
not complete diversity of citizenship as between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants, with the result that the fourth count is one which could 
come within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district court 
only as a claim "supplemental" to validly pleaded federal claims. 28 
U.S.C. S 1367(a). Since the district court concluded that the federal 
claims were not cognizable, and it is the correctness of that ruling which 
is now before this court, there is no present need for this court to 
consider the fourth count. 
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       to refuse to connect and/or to disconnect, and the 
       right to receive a refund, if exercising said right, of 
       any capitalization fees previously paid and/or any 
       quarterly rates or other fees and costs paid regarding 
       said sewer district. 
 
        D. The plaintiffs be awarded attorneys' fees and 
       other applicable costs or fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
       section 1988; 
 
        E. The plaintiff class be awarded money damages 
       incident to the equitable relief requested and such 
       moneys be placed in trust. Such monies shall be 
       sufficient to compensate the plaintiff class members 
       for any liability and costs incurred on the new sewer 
       district, including but not limited to costs of 
       connections, fees previously paid by the plaintiffs to 
       the defendants plus interest, and to pay for any debt 
       created from construction of the sewer district; and 
 
        F. Plaintiffs have such other legal and equitable 
       relief as the Court may deem appropriate, including 
       costs and expenses.3 
 
Complaint at pp. 19-20 (emphases in original). 
 
In the district court, the defendants moved to dismiss all 
or part of the suit -- or, in the alternative, to stay the suit 
pending state court resolution of state law questions -- on 
a variety of grounds. Defendants chiefly argued that: 1) the 
Tax Injunction Act ("The district courts shall not enjoin, 
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of 
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy may be had in the courts of such State") was a bar 
to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction; 2) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In their brief on appeal, the Property Owners have characterized the 
relief they seek as "(a) A declaration that the`West Rehoboth Expansion 
of the Dewey Beach Sanitary Sewer District' is void ab initio; (b) 
Injunctive relief barring mandatory connections; barring new 
construction on Phase III of the sewer project; and barring related 
charges; (c) Attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1988; 
and (d) Compensatory damages resulting from the unlawful creation of 
the sewer district and its sewer system." Appellants' Brief on Appeal, pp. 
3-4. 
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principles of comity required dismissal of the suit; and 3) 
the Clean Water Act claim was not cognizable against the 
DNREC defendants. The district court concluded that the 
suit should be dismissed. Kerns v. Dukes, 944 F. Supp. 
1214 (D. Del. 1996). Central to the district court's analysis 
was the determination that the suit was a challenge to the 
imposition and enforcement of taxes: as noted above, the 
suit seeks inter alia to enjoin the defendants "from charging 
or assessing said members of the class for the costs of 
creating, constructing, maintaining and operating said 
sewer district (and any debt thereon)." As a challenge to a 
local taxation scheme, the suit was found by the district 
court to run afoul both of federal comity principles and of 
the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1341. The district court 
went on to state: 
 
       This holding does not put an end to plaintiffs' chances 
       of prevailing on their lawsuit in the state court system. 
       All arguments made by plaintiffs before this Court may 
       be made in a state court. 
 
Id. at 1222. In an order dated November 8, 1996, the 
district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and the Property Owners appealed to this 
court. 
 
On appeal, the Property Owners contended that: "The 
primary, objective purpose of the present lawsuit is to 
address the arbitrary and capricious establishment of a 
sewer district. Thus, the relief requested in the case at bar 
does not implicate Federal Comity or the Tax Injunction 
Act." Appellants' Brief p. 34. After oral argument, and 
because the resolution of this appeal potentially implicated 
a question of Delaware law, this court issued an order 
certifying a question to the Supreme Court of Delaware.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Delaware Supreme Court Rule 41(a)(ii) provides: 
 
        The Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the 
       United States, the United States District Court or the Highest 
       Appellate Court of any other State may, on motion or sua sponte, 
       certify to this Court for decision a question or questions of law 
       arising in any case before it prior to the entry offinal judgment 
if 
       there is an important and urgent reason for an immediate 
       determination of such question or questions by this Court and the 
       certifying court has not decided the question or questions in the 
       case. 
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Our certification order read, in relevant part; 5 
 
        There are two crucial issues on appeal. As to the 
       first, without now deciding the issue we will assume for 
       the purposes of this certification order that the district 
       court is correct that plaintiffs' suit is the sort of 
       challenge to the processes of state and local taxation 
       which federal comity doctrines and the Tax Injunction 
       Act were designed to keep out of a federal district 
       court. The remaining issue is whether the courts of 
       Delaware can provide plaintiffs with (in the language of 
       the Tax Injunction Act, language which we also regard 
       as applicable to the comity aspect of the case) a"plain, 
       speedy and efficient remedy." This is of course a federal 
       question to be determined by this Court. However, the 
       federal question is one whose basic ingredients 
       constitute a question of Delaware law. Therefore, as 
       ordered below, we will certify to the Supreme Court of 
       Delaware the following question: 
 
        To what extent does the jurisdiction of Delaware's 
       courts (whether taken singly or in combination) 
       encompass plaintiffs' claims, and to what extent are 
       Delaware's courts able to provide such relief as those 
       claims, if sustained, would entail? 
 
        We seek, that is, to ascertain the degree to which 
       plaintiffs are able to pursue in the courts of Delaware 
       those claims that they have chiefly pressed in the 
       federal district court: "First, that they were arbitrarily 
       denied the right to vote on a new district. Second, they 
       were arbitrarily denied an environmental process which 
       we believe to be fixed and vested. And third, that the 
       sewer district that was built is not legitimately or 
       rationally related to an existing health menace for the 
       need for that sewer. And that's the basis of the 
       lawsuit." Argument of Counsel for Plaintiffs at Hearing 
       Before District Court on Motions to Dismiss, Oct. 16, 
       1996, Transcript at 16-17. We seek also to ascertain to 
       what degree the requested relief -- including a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The full text of this court's certification order is annexed hereto as 
Appendix A. 
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       declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and money 
       damages -- may be obtained in the courts of Delaware. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court, after full briefing and 
argument, handed down an opinion carefully and 
comprehensively addressing the issues tendered by our 
inquiry with respect to Delaware law. Regarding the 
Property Owners' S 1983 claims, the Delaware Supreme 
Court stated that:6 
 
        [T]he state courts of Delaware may hear the Property 
       Owners' S 1983 claims. . . . While concurrent 
       jurisdiction over S 1983 claims may lie in either the 
       Superior Court or the Court of Chancery, the selection 
       of the forum is dictated by the relief sought. The 
       Property Owners seek declaratory relief, injunctive 
       relief and money damages on their S 1983 claims. They 
       also seek an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 
       U.S.C. S 1988. 
 
        The Court of Chancery has exclusive jurisdiction 
       where injunctive relief is sought. The Court of 
       Chancery may award declaratory relief, where there is 
       otherwise a basis for equitable jurisdiction. The 
       requests for an award of money damages and for 
       attorneys' fees do not prevent the Court of Chancery 
       from exercising jurisdiction over the S 1983 claims. The 
       Court of Chancery, in its discretion, may elect to 
       exercise jurisdiction over legal claims concurrent to 
       equitable claims properly before it. Once the Court of 
       Chancery accepts jurisdiction over the entire 
       controversy, the court is empowered to resolve the 
       entire controversy, even if doing so requires an award 
       of a purely legal remedy, such as money damages. 
       Finally, sovereign immunity does not bar an action 
       brought pursuant to S 1983. Accordingly, the Court of 
       Chancery has jurisdiction over the Property Owners' 
       S 1983 claims. 
 
Kerns v. Dukes, 707 A.2d 363, 367-68 (Del. 1998) 
(footnotes and citations omitted). With respect to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The full text of the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion is annexed 
hereto as Appendix B. 
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Property Owners' claim that they were arbitrarily denied an 
environmental review under the Clean Water Act, the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated that: 
 
        Under 29 Del.C. S 8003(12) and the State Revolving 
       Fund Agreement, the DNREC Secretary is required to 
       conduct an environmental review. This review is 
       mandatory and may be enforced in equity. DNREC is 
       not protected from injunctive relief by the doctrine of 
       sovereign immunity. Thus, it appears that the Property 
       Owners would be able to obtain an injunction ordering 
       performance of the reviews they seek. 
 




Aided by the opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court, we 
now are in a position to resolve the issues posed by this 
appeal. 
 
The Tax Injunction Act bars a federal court from 
enjoining "the assessment, levy or collection of any tax 
under state law" where state law provides a "plain, speedy 
and efficient" remedy. In Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 
450 U.S. 503 (1981), the Supreme Court recognized that 
"[t]he statute `has its roots in equity practice, in principles 
of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of 
a State to administer its own fiscal operations.' " Id. at 522 
(quoting Tully v. Griffin, Inc. 429 U.S. 68, 73 (1976)). In 
California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982), 
the Court held that the Tax Injunction Act bars federal 
courts from hearing declaratory judgment actions in state 
tax cases. Id. at 407. 
 
In Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary, 454 U.S. 
100 (1981), the Court determined that suits seeking 
damages because of the imposition of allegedly wrongful 
taxes are not cognizable in a federal court; while not 
expressly barred by the Tax Injunction Act, damage actions 
are barred by principles of comity provided that effective 
relief is obtainable in state court. The Court reasoned that 
damage actions "would be no less disruptive of [a state's] 
tax system than would the historic equitable efforts to 
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enjoin the collection of taxes, efforts which were early held 
barred by considerations of comity." Id. at 112. Taken 
together, the Tax Injunction Act and the Supreme Court's 
decision in McNary make it clear that a federal court cannot 
entertain a suit posing either an equitable or a legal 
challenge to state or local taxes ("any tax under state law") 
if a sufficient remedy (a remedy which the Tax Injunction 
Act terms "plain, speedy and efficient" and which comity 
views as "plain, adequate and complete")7 is available in 
state court. See 454 U.S. at 115. 
 
Therefore, this appeal presents two principal issues: 
First, whether the Property Owners' suit constitutes a 
challenge to the processes of state or local taxation; and 
second, whether the courts of Delaware can provide the 
Property Owners with a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy 
for the Property Owners' claims. 
 
Subsequent to the issuance of the Delaware Supreme 
Court's opinion, the Property Owners submitted to 
this court a supplemental memorandum captioned 
"Memorandum of Appellants Addressing the Delaware 
Supreme Court's Answer to the Certified Question of Law." 
In that memorandum, the Property Owners have 
acknowledged that state law "affords them the potential for 
all of the relief that they request in the Federal Complaint." 
Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum, p. 3. Accordingly, 
the Property Owners have narrowed their argument on 
appeal to the following: "[w]hile the state forum may afford 
all the relief requested, it is submitted that federal court 
jurisdiction should remain open to the Property Owners 
because this is not a state tax case (i.e., prong one of the 
two part Federal Comity/Tax Injunction analysis)."8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In McNary, the Court stated that: 
 
        We discern no significant difference, for purposes of the 
principles 
       recognized in this case, between remedies which are"plain, 
       adequate, and complete," as that phrase has been used in 
       articulating the doctrine of equitable restraint, and those which 
are 
       "plain, speedy and efficient," within the meaning of S 1341. 
 
454 U.S. at 115. 
 
8. The Property Owners couple this argument with a contention that 
"federal court jurisdiction should remain open to the Property Owners 
 
                                11 
  
Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum, p.4. The Property 
Owners do not dispute the characterization of the 
assessments in this case as a tax. They insist, however, 
that the primary purpose of their suit is to "address the 
arbitrary and capricious establishment of a sewer system" 
and not to challenge the sewer assessments. Therefore, 
according to the Property Owners, maintenance of this suit 
would not constitute federal judicial interference with 
Delaware's state or local tax system. 
 
In McNary, the Supreme Court quoted with approval 
Justice Brennan's explanation in an earlier case of the 
rationale behind federal deference to state courts in state 
tax cases: 
 
        The special reasons justifying the policy of federal 
       noninterference with state tax collection are obvious. 
       The procedures for mass assessment and collection of 
       state taxes and for administration and adjudication of 
       taxpayers' disputes with tax officials are generally 
       complex and necessarily designed to operate according 
       to established rules. State tax agencies are organized to 
       discharge their responsibilities in accordance with the 
       state procedures. If federal declaratory relief were 
       available to test state tax assessments, state tax 
       administration might be thrown into disarray, and 
       taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural 
       requirements imposed by state law. During the 
       pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue 
       under the challenged law might be obstructed, with 
       consequent damage to the State's budget, and perhaps 
       a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency. 
       Moreover, federal constitutional issues are likely to 
       turn on questions of state law, which, like issues of 
       state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the 
       state courts. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
because . . . state law was uncertain at the time of the filing of the 
federal complaint." Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum, p. 4. We do 
not think the authority of a federal district court to entertain a 
plaintiff's 
case can turn on the degree of the plaintiff's lack of certainty at the 
inception of the litigation as to whether the plaintiff's claims are of a 
kind that could be adequately addressed in a state court. 
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454 U.S. at 108 n.6 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 
82, 127-28 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
 
Viewing appellants' complaint in the light of Justice 
Brennan's words, we are persuaded that maintenance of 
this suit would impinge on exactly the state turf that 
Congress and the Court have sought to protect against 
federal judicial intrusion. The Property Owners are 
challenging the actions of the County and DNREC 
defendants in establishing the sewer system which has 
given rise to the assessments they are now required to pay. 
Given the relief sought -- that the sewer district be 
"declared void" and that the defendants be "enjoined from 
requiring members of the class to connect to the unlawfully 
created sewer disrict and from charging or assessing said 
members of the class for the costs of creating, constructing, 
maintaining and operating said sewer district"9 -- we agree 
with the district court that this action, if permitted to go 
forward, would heavily involve the federal courts in 
Delaware tax matters. And, given this direct and 
substantial challenge to a system of assessments -- i.e. 
taxes -- that is now in place, we find unpersuasive the 
argument that the Property Owners' primary target is"the 
arbitrary and capricious establishment of a sewer system" 
and that this somehow insulates the Property Owners' suit 
from the Tax Injunction Act and the demands of comity.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Complaint, p. 19. See also supra note 3. 
 
10. The proposition contended for by the Property Owners is illustrated 
by Pendleton v. Heard, 824 F.2d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 1987), a case 
strongly relied on by the Property Owners in their brief on appeal. 
Pendleton v. Heard was a suit alleging that a proposed county bond 
issue to finance bridge and road construction, if permitted to go forward 
without any opportunity for county voters to seek a county election on 
the bond issue, would contravene section 5 of the federal Voting Rights 
Act. Noting that "the purpose of this suit is the vindication of voting 
rights," and that "[a]ny effect on the issuance of bonds or the subsequent 
imposition of taxes is incidental," id. at 452, the Fifth Circuit reversed 
the district court's order dismissing the suit and remanded for trial 
before a statutory three-judge court as required by the Voting Rights Act. 
In the case at bar, the Property Owners, in challenging assessments that 
have already been imposed, are seeking to recover the assessments that 
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Finally, we turn to the question whether the Delaware 
courts can provide a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy to 
the Property Owners. In order for a remedy in Delaware's 
state courts to satisfy this standard, it must be 
procedurally adequate, Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 512, and 
provide a " `full hearing and judicial determination' at which 
[the Property Owners] may raise any and all constitutional 
objections to the tax." Id. at 514 (quoting LaSalle National 
Bank v. County of Cook, 312 N.E.2d 252, 255-56 (Ill. 
1974)). 
 
The opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court makes it 
clear that the courts of Delaware can indeed provide the 
forms of judicial inquiry and (as appropriate) judicial 
remedy that meet the requirements of the Tax Injunction 
Act and the principles of comity. Indeed, as noted above, 
the supplemental memorandum submitted to this court by 
the Property Owners subsequent to the issuance of the 
authoritative opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court has 
affirmed the Property Owners' recognition that Delaware 
law "affords them the potential for all of the relief that they 
request in the Federal Complaint."11  And should it be the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
have been paid and to enjoin collection of the assessments in the future. 
Closer to the mark than Pendleton v. Heard is Carson v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, 293 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1961), in which the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed dismissal, pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act, of a suit in which 
"[p]laintiffs . . . seek an injunction to restrain the city from carrying 
forward its plan to install sewers and make the consequent assessments 
and service charges." Id. at 338. See also Burris v. City of Little Rock, 
941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Tax Injunction Act barred 
review of a S 1983 action to challenge an assessment to pay for sewer 
improvements). 
 
11. In assessing the scope of the phrase "all of the relief that [the 
Property Owners] request in the Federal Complaint," it should be borne 
in mind that the complaint embraces two S 1983 claims and a Clean 
Water Act claim under 33 U.S.C. S 1365(a)(2). The district court 
"dismiss[ed] plaintiff 's action based on considerations of comity and the 
Tax Injunction Act. As a result . . . the applicability of the Clean Water 
Act [was] not considered." 944 F. Supp. 1218. Given our disposition of 
the antecedent comity and Tax Injunction Act issues, it would not 
appear appropriate for this court to undertake to resolve the academic 
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case that the anticipated proceedings in the Delaware 
courts fail to resolve issues of federal law in a manner 
deemed by the Property Owners to be satisfactory, the 
Property Owners would, pursuant to the Federal Judicial 
Code, be able to seek certiorari review by the Supreme 




       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
question whether the Clean Water Act claim, were it separable from the 
companion counts of the complaint and from the broad relief sought, 
would have been cognizable. Suffice it to note that it is at least 
doubtful 
that a claim that state officials failed to perform certain federally 
mandated environmental and cost reviews fits within the framework of 
33 U.S.C. S 1365(a)(2), which authorizes a citizen to "commence a civil 
action on his own behalf . . . against the [EPA] Administrator where 
there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty 
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator." In 
any event, it appears from the opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court 
that a lawsuit seeking a court order requiring the DNREC Secretary to 
conduct a mandated environmental review is tenable under Delaware's 
equity jurisprudence. 
 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




JOSEPH KERNS, et al. 
 




DALE R. DUKES, et al. 
 
       Appellees 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-113) 
 
Present: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, and POLLAK, District Judge* 
 
ORDER CERTIFYING A QUESTION OF LAW PURSUANT 
TO DELAWARE SUPREME COURT RULE 41 
 
This 31st day of July 1997, the Court having found that: 
 
(1) This matter came before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit on May 21, 1997, on appeal 
from a final judgment of the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware, Honorable Murray M. Schwartz, 
United States District Judge, dismissing plaintiffs' 
complaint on grounds of comity and/or for lack of 
jurisdiction, see 944 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1996); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Hon. Louis H. Pollak, United States District Judge for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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(2) The following facts are undisputed: 
 
(a) This civil action challenges decisions taken by the 
defendants -- members and officials of the Sussex County 
Council ("the County defendants"), and officials of the 
Delaware Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control (DNREC) -- to (1) authorize the 
establishment of the "West Rehoboth Expansion of the 
Dewey Beach Sanitary Sewer District" and (2) take 
subsequent steps to implement such authorization. The 
plaintiffs -- appellants in this Court -- are several persons 
owning real property in the expanded sewer district. The 
plaintiffs allege that, by virtue of the establishment of the 
expanded sewer district, they are being compelled to 
discontinue reliance on their own septic systems and, in 
lieu thereof, to join the expanded sewer system and to pay 
an array of service charges and fees for the privilege of 
obligatory participation in the expanded sewer system. 
 
(b) The complaint sets forth three counts arising under 
federal law. The first count, based upon 42 U.S.C.S 1983, 
alleges deprivations by the County defendants of plaintiffs' 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process; 
this count undergirds plaintiffs' most strongly argued claim 
-- namely, that under Delaware law the establishment of 
the expanded sewer district could be legally accomplished 
only pursuant to a vote (an "election") of the affected 
property owners, a required procedural step not taken in 
this instance. The second count, also based upon 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, alleges that the actions of the County defendants 
and the DNREC defendants have infringed upon plaintiffs' 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process: 
plaintiffs contend that the defendants' actions were not 
based on any rationally supportable public health concerns 
and that they "have impinged upon the plaintiffs' use and 
enjoyment of their real property by mandating afinancial 
charge and legal encumbrance thereon, as well as limiting, 
controlling, and charging for the use of said property." 
Complaint at 15. The third count, undertaking to set forth 
a claim pursuant to 33 U.S.C. S 1365(a)(2), alleges that the 
DNREC defendants failed to perform certain federally 
mandated environmental and cost reviews. (The complaint 
also contains a fourth count charging both sets of 
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defendants with a variety of derelictions of state law. 
However, there is not complete diversity of citizenship as 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants, with the result 
that the fourth count is one which could come within the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district court only 
as a claim "supplemental" to validly pleaded federal claims. 
28 U.S.C. S 1367(a). Since the district court concluded that 
the federal claims were not cognizable, and it is the 
correctness of that ruling which is now before this Court, 
there is no present need for this Court to consider the 
fourth count.) 
 
(c) The plaintiffs have brought this suit as a proposed 
class action, alleging their readiness to represent an 
estimated 7000 persons said to be similarly situated. The 
complaint recites that, by way of relief: 
 
        Plaintiffs request, for themselves and all other 
       members of the class, that: 
 
        A. The rights of the class members to have an 
       election on the establishment of the "West Rehoboth 
       Expansion of the Dewey Beach Sanitary Sewer District" 
       be adjudicated and declared, and that the prior 
       unlawfully decreed Sewer District be declared void ab 
       initio; 
 
        B. The defendants and each of them be temporarily 
       and permanently restrained and enjoined from 
       requiring members of the class to connect to the 
       unlawfully created sewer district and from charging or 
       assessing said members of the class for the costs of 
       creating, constructing, maintaining and operating said 
       sewer district (and any debt thereon), unless and until 
       such time as the sewer district is lawfully created by 
       election and compliance with 9 Del.C. Ch. 65, after 
       proper environmental and cost review, and from any 
       further construction of said sewer district, or creation of 
       new debt thereon, without further order of the Court; 
 
        C. The defendants be Ordered to notify all persons, 
       within the said sewer district, of their right to refuse to 
       connect and/or to disconnect, and the right to receive 
       a refund, if exercising said right, of any capitalization 
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       fees previously paid and/or any quarterly rates or 
       other fees and costs paid regarding said sewer district. 
 
        D. The plaintiffs be awarded attorneys' fees and 
       other applicable costs or fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
       section 1988; 
 
        E. The plaintiff class be awarded money damages 
       incident to the equitable relief requested and such 
       moneys be placed in trust. Such monies shall be 
       sufficient to compensate the plaintiff class members for 
       any liability and costs incurred on the new sewer 
       district, including but not limited to costs of 
       connections, fees previously paid by the plaintiffs to 
       the defendants plus interest, and to pay for any debt 
       created from construction of the sewer district; and 
 
        F. Plaintiffs have such other legal and equitable 
       relief as the Court may deem appropriate, including 
       costs and expenses. 
 
Complaint at 19-20 (emphases in original). 
 
(d) In the district court, the defendants moved to 
dismiss all or part of the suit -- or, in the alternative, to 
stay the suit pending state court resolution of state law 
questions -- on a variety of grounds. The district court 
concluded that the suit should be dismissed. Central to its 
analysis was the determination that the suit was a 
challenge to the imposition and enforcement of taxes: as 
noted above, the suit seeks inter alia to enjoin the 
defendants "from charging or assessing said members of the 
class for the costs of creating, constructing, maintaining 
and operating said sewer district (and any debt thereon)." 
As a challenge to a local taxation scheme, the suit was 
found by the district court to run afoul both of federal 
comity doctrines, see, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate 
Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), and of the Tax 
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1341, which provides: "The 
district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the 
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law 
where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in 
the courts of such State." Specifically, the district court 
held: 
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        Mindful of the fact that Sussex County already has 
       invested $70,000,000 in the sewer district and the 
       plaintiffs have been assessed taxes, the Court finds 
       that permitting the present case to go forward will 
       result in substantial federal court interference in the 
       County's revenue collecting ability. The Court 
       alternatively dismisses the case based on the Tax 
       Injunction Act. 
 
944 F. Supp. at 1222. The district court went on to state: 
 
       This holding does not put an end to plaintiffs' chances 
       of prevailing on their lawsuit in the state court system. 
       All arguments made by plaintiffs before this Court may 
       be made in a state court. 
 
Id. This latter recital was not developed in detail in the 
district court's opinion; 
 
(3) The question of law set forth below should be certified 
to the Supreme Court of Delaware for the following reasons: 
 
(a) There are two crucial issues on appeal. As to the 
first, without now deciding the issue we will assume for the 
purposes of this certification order that the district court is 
correct that plaintiffs' suit is the sort of challenge to the 
processes of state and local taxation which federal comity 
doctrines and the Tax Injunction Act were designed to keep 
out of a federal district court. The remaining issue is 
whether the courts of Delaware can provide plaintiffs with 
(in the language of the Tax Injunction Act, language which 
we also regard as applicable to the comity aspect of the 
case) a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy." This is of 
course a federal question to be determined by this Court. 
However, the federal question is one whose basic 
ingredients constitute a question of Delaware law. 
Therefore, as ordered below, we will certify to the Supreme 
Court of Delaware the following question: 
 
        To what extent does the jurisdiction of Delaware's 
       courts (whether taken singly or in combination) 
       encompass plaintiffs' claims, and to what extent are 
       Delaware's courts able to provide such relief as those 
       claims, if sustained, would entail? 
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We seek, that is, to ascertain the degree to which plaintiffs 
are able to pursue in the courts of Delaware those claims 
that they have chiefly pressed in the federal district court: 
"First, that they were arbitrarily denied the right to vote on 
a new district. Second, they were arbitrarily denied an 
environmental process which we believe to be fixed and 
vested. And third, that the sewer district that was built is 
not legitimately or rationally related to an existing health 
menace for the need for that sewer. And that's the basis of 
the lawsuit." Argument of Counsel for Plaintiffs at Hearing 
Before District Court on Motions to Dismiss, Oct. 16, 1996, 
Transcript at 16-17. We seek also to ascertain to what 
degree the requested relief -- including a declaratory 
judgment, injunctive relief, and money damages -- may be 
obtained in the courts of Delaware. 
 
(b) Resolution of the issues of law presented in the 
certified question will guide this Court's analysis of the 
federal question whether a "plain, speedy and efficient" 
remedy is available to plaintiffs in the courts of Delaware. 
In the absence of such an available remedy, this case will 
be heard in federal courts rather than state courts whether 
or not this Court concludes that the complaint constitutes 
a challenge to processes of state and local taxation. An 
appropriate regard for the delicate balance between state 
and national judicial authority counsels that, insofar as 
feasible, decisions relating to the jurisdiction and remedial 
capacity of the Delaware state courts -- decisions central to 
the resolution of this case -- be made by the Delaware 
courts themselves. 
 
(c) Our concern about the remedy available in the 
Delaware courts arises in part from the potential tension 
between the decision of the Court of Chancery in Delaware 
Bankers Ass'n v. Division of Revenue of the Dep't of 
Finance, 298 A.2d 352, 356 (Del. Ch. 1972) (holding that in 
some cases there is an adequate remedy at law for an 
attack on an illegal or unconstitutional tax through the Tax 
Appeal Board), and that of the Superior Court in Tatten 
Partners v. New Castle County Bd. of Assessment Review, 
642 A.2d 1251, 1262-65 (Del. Super. 1993) (holding that 
taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process 
claim to the Board of Assessment Review because of the 
limited jurisdiction of that board); 
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(4) The important and urgent reasons for an immediate 
determination by the Supreme Court of Delaware of the 
question certified are: 
 
(a) Determination of the certified question is important 
to the resolution of a controversy that assertedly affects 
some 7000 Delaware property owners and challenges 
outlays of at least $70,000,000. The State of Delaware has 
a substantial interest in ensuring the most authoritative 
possible determination of the issues on which this litigation 
turns. 
 
(b) A definitive determination by the Supreme Court of 
Delaware of the remedies available to plaintiffs in the 
Delaware state courts will obviate the need for this Court to 
speculate on that question, and will avert the possibility 
that this Court would arrive at a conclusion inconsistent 
with the authoritative result that might be obtained from 
Delaware's highest court; 
 
(5) If certification is accepted, it is recommended that the 
plaintiffs (Joseph Kerns, et al.) be appellants, and that the 
defendants (Dale R. Dukes, et al.) be appellees, for 
purposes of the caption on any filings in the Supreme 
Court of Delaware with respect to the question certified. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the following 
question of law is certified to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Delaware for disposition in accordance with Rule 
41 of that Court: 
 
        To what extent does the jurisdiction of Delaware's 
       courts (whether taken singly or in combination) 
       encompass plaintiffs' claims, and to what extent are 
       Delaware's courts able to provide such relief as those 
       claims, if sustained, would entail? 
 
In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 41, it is 
recommended that briefs shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court in the following order: the initial brief shall be filed 
by the plaintiffs as appellants, and any responsive brief(s) 
shall be filed by the defendants as appellees. 
 
This Court shall retain jurisdiction meanwhile. 
 
       BY:  
        Louis H. Pollak 
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This matter originated through the filing of a civil action 
in the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware. Plaintiffs in that action are Sussex County, 
Delaware, property owners (the "Property Owners"), who 
challenged the decision to create a new sewer district, in 
which they are included, and the actions taken to 
implement that decision by defendants, the members and 
officials of the Sussex County Council (the "County") and 
officials of the Delaware Department of Natural Resources 
and Environmental Control ("DNREC"). The District Court 
dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds, and the 
Property Owners appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit"). 
 
By order dated July 31, 1997, the Third Circuit certified 
the following question of law to this Court: 
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       To what extent does the jurisdiction of Delaware's 
       courts (whether taken singly or in combination) 
       encompass plaintiffs' claims, and to what extent are 
       Delaware's courts able to provide such relief as those 
       claims, if sustained, would entail? 
 
For the purpose of this certification, the Third Circuit 
assumes that the Property Owners' suit is the sort of 
challenge to the processes of state and local taxation that 
federal comity doctrines and the Tax Injunction Act were 
designed to preclude from the jurisdiction of federal district 
courts.1 
 
We conclude, in answer to the certified question, that the 
Court of Chancery would have jurisdiction over a state 
action based on the Property Owners' claims and could 




The Property Owners' suit was brought as a purported 
class action, with the class estimated at 7,000 Sussex 
County property owners. They assert standing to pursue 
their claims as taxpayers. The Property Owners contend 
that they are being compelled to discontinue reliance on 
their own septic systems, and to join and to pay the costs 
of, and fees for, the expanded sewer system. In the 
complaint, the Property Owners allege: (i) violation of their 
procedural due process rights, under the 14th Amendment 
and 42 U.S.C. S 1983, by the County's failure to hold a vote 
on expansion of the sewer district; (ii) violation of their 
substantive due process rights, under the 14th Amendment 
and 42 U.S.C. S 1983, by actions taken by the County and 
DNREC, which were not based on any rationally 
supportable public health concern and which impinge upon 
their use and enjoyment of their real property though 
financial charge and legal encumbrances thereon; and (iii) 
failure by DNREC to undertake environmental and cost 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Tax Injunction Act provides that federal courts "shall not enjoin, 
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under 
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the 
courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. S 1341. 
 
                                27 
  
reviews federally mandated in the Clean Water Act (the 
"CWA"), see 33 U.S.C. S 1251,et seq.2 The Property Owners' 
counsel summarized their claims as 
 
       [f]irst, that they were arbitrarily denied the right to vote 
       on a new district. Second, they were arbitrarily denied 
       an environmental process which we believe to befixed 
       and vested. And third, that the sewer district that was 
       built is not legitimately or rationally related to an 
       existing health menace.... 
 
As relief, the Property Owners request, "for themselves 
and all other members of the class," that: 
 
        A. The rights of the class members to have an 
       election on the establishment of the "West Rehoboth 
       Expansion of the Dewey Beach Sanitary Sewer District" 
       be adjudicated and declared, and that the prior 
       unlawfully decreed Sewer District be declared void ab 
       initio; 
 
        B. The defendants and each of them be temporarily 
       and permanently restrained and enjoined from 
       requiring members of the class to connect to the 
       unlawfully created sewer district and from charging or 
       assessing said members of the class for the costs of 
       creating, constructing, maintaining and operating said 
       sewer district (and any debt thereon), unless and until 
       such time as the sewer district is lawfully created by 
       election and compliance with 9 Del.C. ch. 65, after 
       proper environmental and cost review, and from any 
       further construction of said sewer district, or creation 
       of new debt thereon, without further order of the 
       Court; 
 
        C. The defendants be Ordered to notify all persons, 
       within the said sewer district, of their right to refuse to 
       connect and/or disconnect and the right to receive a 
       refund, if exercising said right, of any capitalization 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Property Owners also bring a fourth claim, based solely on state law, 
which is before the federal court as a claim supplemental to validly 
pleaded federal claims. Because only the validity of the federal claims is 
now before the Third Circuit, there is no need to consider the fourth 
claim at this time. 
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       fees previously paid and/or any quarterly rates or 
       other fees and costs paid regarding said sewer district; 
 
        D. The plaintiffs be awarded attorneys' fees and 
       other applicable costs or fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
       section 1988; 
 
        E. The plaintiff class be awarded money damages 
       incident to the equitable relief requested and such 
       monies placed in trust. Such monies shall be sufficient 
       to compensate the plaintiff class members for any 
       liability and costs incurred on the new sewer district, 
       including but not limited to costs of connections, fees 
       previously paid by plaintiffs to the defendants plus 
       interest, and to pay for any debt created from the 
       construction of the sewer district; and 
 
        F. Plaintiffs have such other legal and equitable 
       relief as the Court may deem appropriate, including 
       costs and expenses. 
 
(Complaint at 19-20 (emphasis in original).) In sum, the 
Property Owners seek declaratory relief, injunctive relief, 
money damages, and counsel fees. 
 
The County and DNREC moved, on various grounds, to 
dismiss all or part of the suit, or, in the alternative, to stay 
the suit pending state court resolution of state law 
questions. The United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction based 
on the Tax Injunction Act.3 Kerns v. Dukes, D.Del., 944 
F.Supp. 1214, 1219-22 (1996). The District Court 
concluded, in part, that allowing the Property Owners to 
pursue their claim in federal court would result in 
"substantial federal court interference in [Sussex] County's 
revenue collecting ability." Id. at 1222. 
 
The Property Owners appealed the dismissal to the Third 
Circuit, where the appeal is now pending. To address fully 
the Property Owners' claims on appeal, the Third Circuit 
must determine the federal question of whether a"plain, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court also dismissed the suit on the alternative ground of 
comity. Because the question as certified implicates only the 
jurisdictional ruling, we do not address comity concerns. 
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speedy and efficient"4 remedy is available for the Property 
Owners in Delaware's courts. Specifically, the Third Circuit 
seeks guidance from this Court as to the following: 
 
       We seek, that is, to ascertain the degree to which 
       plaintiffs are able to pursue in the courts of Delaware 
       those claims that they have chiefly pressed in the 
       federal district court: `First, that they were arbitrarily 
       denied the right to vote on a new district. Second, they 
       were arbitrarily denied an environmental process which 
       [they] believe to be fixed and vested. And third, that the 
       sewer district that was built is not legitimately or 
       rationally related to an existing health menace for the 
       need for that sewer....' We seek also to ascertain to 
       what degree the requested relief--including a 
       declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and money 
       damages--may be obtained in the courts of Delaware. 
 
The Third Circuit certified its question to this Court out of 
concern for what it sees as "potential tension" between the 
decision of the Court of Chancery in Delaware Bankers 
Association v. Division of Revenue of the Department of 
Finance, Del.Ch., 298 A.2d 352 (1972), and the Superior 
Court's holding in Tatten Partners v. New Castle County 





This Court must examine a certified question of law in 
the context in which it arises. Rales v. Blasband, Del.Supr., 
634 A.2d 927, 931 (1993). "The scope of issues that may be 
considered in addressing a certified question is limited by 
the procedural posture of the case." Id. The matter before 
the Third Circuit on appeal arises from a motion to dismiss. 
On appeal from a motion to dismiss, all well-pled 
allegations of the complaint are accepted as true. Precision 
Air, Inc. v. Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc., Del.Supr., 654 
A.2d 403, 406 (1995). Moreover, our certification 
acceptance is limited to the facts stated in the Third 
Circuit's Order of certification. Supr.Ct.R. 41(c)(iv). This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Tax Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C. S 1341. 
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requirement necessarily limits the scope of our holding to 




We first consider the Property Owners' claims brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging violation of 
substantive and procedural due process rights by the 
County and by DNREC. State courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the federal courts over actions brought 
under S 1983. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 
S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). Thus, the state courts of 
Delaware may hear the Property Owners' S 1983 claims. 
 
The Property Owners express concern about an apparent 
conflict between the holdings in Delaware Bankers and 
Tatten Partners. A closer examination of the two cases, 
however, reveals that there is no actual tension. In 
Delaware Bankers, the Court of Chancery declined to 
exercise equitable jurisdiction because there was an 
adequate remedy at law for the alleged constitutional 
violations resulting from the application of a tax--review by 
the State Tax Commissioner, followed by appeals, as of 
right, first to the Tax Appeal Board and finally to the 
Superior Court.5 298 A.2d at 358. Tatten Partners holds 
that a taxpayer's S 1983 claim against the county Board of 
Assessment is not properly before the Superior Court on 
appeal from the Board because judicial review is limited to 
the merits of the assessment proceeding. 642 A.2d at 1262. 
These cases, however, do not prevent primary jurisdiction 
in either the Superior Court or the Court of Chancery over 
direct claims made pursuant to S 1983. Further, the 
Property Owners are not barred from access to the Superior 
Court by Tatten Partners because there is no administrative 
remedy that they must first exhaust. See Del.C., title 9; 
Carr v. Board of Assessment Review, Del.Super., C.A. No. 
93A-04-008, Graves, J., 1995 WL 109003 (Feb. 22, 1995); 
Riley v. Banks, Del.Super., 62 A.2d 229 (1948). 
 
While concurrent jurisdiction over S 1983 claims may lie 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Delaware Bankers also addresses the requirements for class actions 
under Court of Chancery Rule 23. 
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in either the Superior Court or the Court of Chancery, the 
selection of the forum is dictated by the relief sought. The 
Property Owners seek declaratory relief, injunctive relief 
and money damages on their S 1983 claims. 6 They also seek 
an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1988. 
 
The Court of Chancery has exclusive jurisdiction where 
injunctive relief is sought. 10 Del.C. S 341; Clark v. Teeven 
Holding Co., Del.Ch., 625 A.2d 869, 875 (1992) (citing 1 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence S 139 (5th ed. 1951)). See 
also, du Pont v. du Pont, Del.Supr., 85 A.2d 724 (1951). The 
Court of Chancery may award declaratory relief, where 
there is otherwise a basis for equitable jurisdiction. 10 
Del.C. S 6501. The requests for an award of money damages 
and for attorneys' fees do not prevent the Court of 
Chancery from exercising jurisdiction over the S 1983 
claims. The Court of Chancery, in its discretion, may elect 
to exercise jurisdiction over legal claims concurrent to 
equitable claims properly before it. Clark, 625 A.2d at 881- 
82. Once the Court of Chancery accepts jurisdiction over 
the entire controversy, the court is empowered to resolve 
the entire controversy, even if doing so requires an award 
of a purely legal remedy, such as money damages. Wilmont 
Homes v. Weiler, Del.Supr., 202 A.2d 576, 580 (1964). 
Finally, sovereign immunity does not bar an action brought 
pursuant to S 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 n. 10, 
105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (injunctive relief is available under 
S 1983 against a state official in his or her official capacity); 
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 
S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (S 1983 applies 
to municipalities and other local governments). Accordingly, 
the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over the Property 
Owners' S 1983 claims. 
 
With respect to the equivalency of the relief available in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. To the extent that it is later determined that an adequate remedy at 
law exists for the Property Owners' S 1983 claims, which the Third 
Circuit has assumed to be challenges to state taxation, neither a 
Delaware court nor a federal court could award injunctive or declaratory 
relief. National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Cmm'n, 515 U.S. 
582, 592, 115 S.Ct. 2351, 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995). 
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Delaware's courts, the concurrent jurisdiction of state 
courts over S 1983 claims allows for relief identical to that 
available in federal courts. Further, the Property Owners 
would be entitled to recover attorneys' fees, pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. S 1988, in Delaware's courts, provided that they 
establish that disposition of the case was on "substantial" 
constitutional grounds. Slawik v. State, Del.Supr., 480 A.2d 
636, 640-41 (1984). In any event, the inability to recover 
attorneys' fees does not render the state remedy 
inadequate. National Private Truck Council, 515 U.S. at 592, 
115 S.Ct. at 2357. Accordingly, the answer to the certified 
question is that Delaware's courts would have jurisdiction 
over the Property Owners' S 1983 claims and, should the 
Property Owners prevail, they would be entitled to relief 




Turning next to the Clean Water Act claims, we are asked 
to determine whether Delaware's courts would have 
jurisdiction over a state action embracing the substance of 
those claims and, should the Property Owners prevail, 
whether Delaware's courts could grant relief equivalent to 
that available in federal court. The answer to the relief 
question controls the jurisdiction question and, thus, must 
be addressed first. Upon careful review of the Property 
Owners' complaint, it appears clear that they seek 
injunctive relief requiring DNREC to perform federally 
mandated environmental and cost reviews. See Western Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Del.Ch., 313 A.2d 145 
(1973). The relief available in a citizen suit brought 
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. S 1365(a)(2)7  is limited to: (i) an order 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. 33 U.S.C. S 1365(a)(2) provides that 
 
       any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-- 
 
* * * 
 
       (2) against the Administrator where there is an alleged failure of 
       the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter 
       which is not discretionary with the Administrator. 
 
       The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce such an 
       effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the 
       Administrator to perform such act or duty.... 
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directed to the EPA Administrator8 requiring performance of 
a nondiscretionary duty, such as performing the 
environmental and cost reviews; and (ii) an award of costs, 
including attorneys' fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C.S 1365(d), 
to be made at the discretion of the District Court. 
 
Under 29 Del.C. S 8003(12)9  and the State Revolving Fund 
Agreement,10 the DNREC Secretary is required to conduct 
an environmental review. This review is mandatory and 
may be enforced in equity. See Choma v. O'Rouke, Del.Ch., 
300 A.2d 39, 41 (1972) (Court of Chancery may review a 
decision by an state agency administrator where the 
decision was arbitrary or an abuse of discretion). DNREC is 
not protected from injunctive relief by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. See Will, supra. Thus, it appears that 
the Property Owners would be able to obtain an injunction 
ordering performance of the reviews they seek. With respect 
to attorneys' fees, the Court of Chancery may award 
attorneys' fees as costs pursuant to 10 Del.C. S 5106 and 
Court of Chancery Rule 54(d), where, in its discretion, the 
equities so dictate. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, Del.Ch., 
208 A.2d 677, 681-82 (1965). Accordingly, it appears that 
equivalent relief is available in the Court of Chancery. 
 
Because injunctive relief is sought, jurisdiction lies in the 
Court of Chancery. 10 Del.C. S 341; Clark, supra. It does 
not appear that there are any requirements incident to 
securing preliminary injunctive relief in the Court of 
Chancery that would not be required of the Property 
Owners in a federal action. The Property Owners could be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The parties agree that the EPA Administrator would not be a 
necessary party to any state action. 
 
9. 29 Del.C. S 8003(12) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he Secretary 
shall conduct an environmental review of projects otherwise qualifying 
under this subsection which shall be sufficiently consistent with the 
provisions for environmental review established under 40 C.F.R., Part 6, 
and the Secretary's environmental review standards established in Title 
7." 
 
10. The State Revolving Fund Agreement is the agreement between the 
EPA Administrator and the State of Delaware that permits the grant of 
federal funds, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. S 1381(a), to provide assistance in 
the construction, implementation or development of water pollution 
control programs. 33 U.S.C. S 1382(a). 
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required to post a bond under either Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65(c) or under Court of Chancery Rule 65(c).11 33 
U.S.C. S 1365(d). Further, there are no administrative 
remedies that the Property Owners would be required to 
exhaust before bringing their suit directly in the Court of 
Chancery. 
 
In sum, the answer to the certified question is that the 
jurisdiction of Delaware's courts encompasses claims based 
on the CWA and that Delaware's courts are capable of 
providing such relief as those claims, if sustained, would 
entail. 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the 
answer to the certified question is as follows: 
 
       The jurisdiction of the courts of Delaware encompasses 
       the Property Owners' S 1983 claims as brought, and 
       such courts may provide relief equivalent to that 
       available in federal court, should the claims be 
       sustained. The jurisdiction of the courts of Delaware 
       also encompasses state law claims upon which the 
       Property Owners may recover relief equivalent to that 
       available in federal court on their CWA claims, should 
       they prevail. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Both Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c) and Ch.Ct. R. 65(c) provide that 
 
[n]o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except 
upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the 
court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as 
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been 
wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 
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